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Motivation
• Growing interest in employers vis-à-vis earnings dispersion
• Measurement: AKM (’99) to Card et al. (’19)
• Methods: AKM (’99) to Bonhomme et al. (’19)
• Common approach: control for employer identity
• Leaves open two important questions:
1. Why do some employers pay more than others?
2. How permanent are employer pay policies?
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What We Do
We investigate ﬁrm pay in cross-section & over time by combining
• linked employer-employee data from Sweden,
• register data on individual characteristics for all workers,
• income statement & balance sheet data for all ﬁrms
in order to
1. estimate AKM equation augmented with ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects
2. relate (dynamics of) ﬁrm pay to (dynamics of) ﬁrm ﬁnancials
3. measure static & dynamic sorting between workers & ﬁrms
Main Findings
1. 50% greater role for ﬁrm heterogeneity w/ dynamic pay policies
2. Firm-year pay related to ﬁrm ﬁnancials (R2 = 0:385)
3. Fluctuations (RMSE = 0:056) and mean reversion ( = 0:865)
4. Changes in ﬁrm-year pay related to changes in ﬁrm ﬁnancials
5. Sorting is positive in cross section but negative over time
Contribution to Literature
I. Why do some employers pay more than others?
• Pure wage dispersion (Burdett & Mortensen ’98)
• Productivity (AKM ’99; Barth et al. ’16; Card et al. ’16; Alvarez et al. ’18)
• Productivity + search frictions + minimum wage (Engbom & Moser ’19)
• Productivity + selection into trade (Helpman al. ’17)
• Productivity + compensating differentials + technology (Lamadon et al. ’19)
• Amenities (Sorkin ’18)
• Prod. + search frictions + tech. + amenities + discrim. (Morchio & Moser ’19)
II. Dynamics of employer pay
• van Reenen (’96); Guiso et al. (’05); Lemieux et al. (’09); Schmieder (’13); Card et
al. (’14); Lamadon (’16); Ellul et al. (’17); Garin & Silvério (’18); Babina et al. (’19);
Kline et al. (’19); Moser et al. (’19)
III. Sorting between workers & employers
• AKM (’99); Andrews et al. (’08, ’12); Eeckhout & Kircher (’11); Gulyas (’17); Lopes de
Melo (’18); Borovickova & Shimer (’18); Bonhomme et al. (’19); Lentz et al. (’19)
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Data
Data
• Admin. linked employer-employee data from Sweden, 2004–2015
• All employed men & women of age 18–64
• App. 1.3–1.8 million unique workers per year
• Monthly earnings = salary + wages + bonuses
• Main advantage: rich data on worker and ﬁrm observables
Worker-Level Observables
Worker demographics
• Gender, age, place of birth
Family characteristics
• Family ID, municipality of residence, number & age of children
Educational background
• Highest academic degree completed
• High school ID, high school specialization, high school grades
• College ID, college ﬁeld of study, college degree type
• Cognitive & noncognitive skills test scores (enlistment)
Skill and job characteristics
• Experience, job tenure, hours (sample), occupation (sample)
Worker-Level Observables
Worker demographics
• Gender, age, place of birth
Family characteristics
• Family ID, municipality of residence, number & age of children
Educational background
• Highest academic degree completed
• High school ID, high school specialization, high school grades
• College ID, college ﬁeld of study, college degree type
• Cognitive & noncognitive skills test scores (enlistment)
Skill and job characteristics
• Experience, job tenure, hours (sample), occupation (sample)
Worker-Level Observables
Worker demographics
• Gender, age, place of birth
Family characteristics
• Family ID, municipality of residence, number & age of children
Educational background
• Highest academic degree completed
• High school ID, high school specialization, high school grades
• College ID, college ﬁeld of study, college degree type
• Cognitive & noncognitive skills test scores (enlistment)
Skill and job characteristics
• Experience, job tenure, hours (sample), occupation (sample)
Worker-Level Observables
Worker demographics
• Gender, age, place of birth
Family characteristics
• Family ID, municipality of residence, number & age of children
Educational background
• Highest academic degree completed
• High school ID, high school specialization, high school grades
• College ID, college ﬁeld of study, college degree type
• Cognitive & noncognitive skills test scores (enlistment)
Skill and job characteristics
• Experience, job tenure, hours (sample), occupation (sample)
Firm-Level Observables
Firm demographics
• Age, size, incorporation status, sector, region
Income statement
• Sales, value added, EBIT, total labor costs, wage bill, investment
Balance sheet
• Short-term & long-term assets, debt, equity
Firm-Level Observables
Firm demographics
• Age, size, incorporation status, sector, region
Income statement
• Sales, value added, EBIT, total labor costs, wage bill, investment
Balance sheet
• Short-term & long-term assets, debt, equity
Firm-Level Observables
Firm demographics
• Age, size, incorporation status, sector, region
Income statement
• Sales, value added, EBIT, total labor costs, wage bill, investment
Balance sheet
• Short-term & long-term assets, debt, equity
Summary Statistics, 2004–2015
Mean Std. dev.
Panel A. Worker-level variables
Worker age (years) 39.62 11.10
Share with college degree 0.213
Monthly earnings (log SEK) 10.25 0.48
Panel B. Firm-level variables
Firm size (thousands of employees) 1.42 3.05
Firm age (years) 19.20 8.37
Sales (billion SEK) 4.60 10.45
Value added (billion SEK) 1.28 4.13
Assets (billion SEK) 5.48 2.34
Debt (billion SEK) 2.61 9.19
Equity (billion SEK) 2.87 10.84
Investment (billion SEK) 0.13 0.53
Observations 18,412,038
Measuring Worker & Firm Pay
Heterogeneity
First Stage: Estimating Worker and Firm-Year FEs
First stage: Estimate AKM equation with ﬁrm-year FEs, letting
yit = i +  jt + Xit + "it;
for individual i employed at ﬁrm j = J(i; t) in year t, where
yit is log earnings,
i is a worker FE,
 jt is a ﬁrm-year FE,
Xit is a set of restricted age FEs, and
"it is an error term.
Identification of Model with Firm-Year FEs Illustration
Essentially, workers & ﬁrms in connected set determined as usual
Model with ﬁrm FEs (AKM):
• “Physical ﬁrms” can exist for multiple years
• Identiﬁcation for workers and “physical ﬁrms” in connected sets
• Connected sets deﬁned by switches between “physical ﬁrms”
• Workers moving between “physical ﬁrms” constitute switches
Model with ﬁrm-year FEs (generalization of AKM):
• “Physical ﬁrms” switch identity each year
• Identiﬁcation for workers and ﬁrm-years in connected sets
• Connected sets deﬁned by switches between ﬁrm-years
• All repeat worker observations constitute switches
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First Stage Results: Variance Decomposition Firm FEs Wages
First-stage AKM equation: yit = i +  jt + Xit + "it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Var  yijt 0.235 0.230 0.231 0.234 0.235
Var (bi) 0.124 0.121 0.125 0.130 0.132
Var
 b jt 0.044 0.028 0.022 0.019 0.019
Var

Xit b 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.019
2P Cov () 0.000 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.018
Var  b"ijt 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047
Corr
bi; b jt 0.011 0.094 0.124 0.129 0.127
Observations 21,145,007 18,425,427 15,091,142 11,313,701 9,392,584
Unique workers 3,056,376 2,801,551 2,437,724 1,959,034 1,685,029
Unique ﬁrms 2,134,700 628,190 202,346 51,833 23,761
Largest connected set 98.1% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
R2 0.814 0.799 0.798 0.801 0.802
Firm FE type Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year
Income concept Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Minimum ﬁrm size 0 5 15 50 100
Summary: Firm-Year FE Specification
Firm-year FEs
1. account for signiﬁcant share of earnings dispersion (10%)
2. account for signiﬁcantly more (+50%) than ﬁrm FEs (6%)
3. are relatively constant in Var & Corr for minimum ﬁrm size  15
Second Stage: Accounting for Worker and Firm-Year FEs
Second stage: Project estimated FEs from AKM equation
yit = i +  jt + Xit + "it
on observables:
bi = ZWi  + Wi ;b jt = ZFjt + Fjt;
for individual i and ﬁrm j in year t, wherebi is the estimated ﬁrst-stage worker FE,
ZWi is a vector of observable worker characteristics,
Wi is a worker-side error term,b jt is the estimated ﬁrst-stage ﬁrm-year FE,
ZFjt is a vector of observable ﬁrm characteristics, and
Fjt is a ﬁrm-side error term.
Second Stage: Worker Pay & Observables
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Second Stage: Firm Pay & Value Added per Worker
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Note: exp(13.0) SEK ≅ 450,000 SEK ≅ USD 50,000.
Second Stage: Firm Pay & Observables By size By age
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Second Stage: Regression Results Adding Firm FEs Larger minimum ﬁrm size
Second-stage equation: b jt = ZFjt + Fjt
(1) (2)
Univariate Multivariate
Firm size (log employees) 0.023 0.008
Firm age (years) 0.035 -0.002
Sales per worker (log SEK) 0.070 0.013
Value added per worker (log SEK) 0.121 0.056
Assets per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.014
Debt per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.018
Equity per worker (log SEK) 0.036 0.004
Investment per worker (log SEK) 0.022 -0.004
Observations 13,865,483 13,865,483
R2 0.385
Year FE Yes Yes
Income concept Earnings Earnings
Minimum ﬁrm size 15 15
Summary: Covariates of Firm-Year FEs
Firm-year FEs
1. are linked to more than one ﬁrm characteristic
2. are most strongly related to ﬁrm productivity (v.a.p.w.)
3. are about 40% accounted for by simple ﬁrm-level observables
Firm Pay Dynamics
Dynamic Firm Pay Policies
• How dynamic vs. ﬁxed are ﬁrm pay policies?
• I.e., does ﬁrm-year FE vs. ﬁrm FE speciﬁcation matter?
• Starting point: autoregressive model
b jt = TX
=1
 b jt  + j + t + jt;
for ﬁrm j in year t, whereb jt is estimated ﬁrm-year FE,
j is a ﬁrm FE,
t is a year FE, and
jt is an error term.
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• How dynamic vs. ﬁxed are ﬁrm pay policies?
• I.e., does ﬁrm-year FE vs. ﬁrm FE speciﬁcation matter?
• Starting point: autoregressive model
b jt = TX
=1
 b jt  + j + t + jt;
for ﬁrm j in year t, whereb jt is estimated ﬁrm-year FE,
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t is a year FE, and
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Idiosyncratic Variation and Autocorrelation Structure
Autoregressive model: b jt =PT=1  b jt  + j + t + jt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE 0.865 0.817 -0.123
2-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE -0.047 -0.023
3-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE 0.157 -0.034
4-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE 0.057 0.020
5-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE 0.011 0.015
6-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE 0.003 0.035
7-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE 0.004 0.028
8-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE -0.012 0.007
9-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE 0.044 0.040
10-year lagged ﬁrm-year FE -0.061 0.021
Observations 16,702,161 16,417,694 14,641,860 1,943,154 1,875,897
R2 0.107 0.842 0.748 0.870 0.983
RMSE 0.135 0.056 0.070 0.046 0.017
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No No Yes
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So Firm Pay is Dynamic... But Why?
• So far: systematic and signiﬁcant dynamics in ﬁrm pay
• But why do ﬁrms change pay over time?
Dynamics in Firm Pay & Value Added
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Dynamics in Firm Pay & Value Added, Various Time Horizons
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Dynamics in Firm Pay & Observables, Various Time Horizons
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Summary: Fluctuations in Firm Pay Policies
Firm-year FEs
1. have ﬂuctuations (RMSE = 0:056), mean reversion ( = 0:865)
2. feature signiﬁcant mobility, increasing in period length
3. change in relation to changes in ﬁrm ﬁnancials, not just noise
Static & Dynamic Sorting
Static Sorting
• So far, we correlated:
• estimates of worker FEs with worker characteristics
• estimates of ﬁrm-year FEs with ﬁrm characteristics
• To measure sorting, study worker/ﬁrm cross-correlations
Deﬁnition
Static sorting := cross-sectional matching b/w worker & ﬁrm types
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Positive Static Sorting:  = 0:124;  = 0:254
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Dynamic Sorting
• Static sorting may conﬂate many economic forces
• E.g., cities attract high-pay ﬁrms & workers (Dauth et al. ’19)
• Alternative: as ﬁrm changes its pay policy, who do they hire?
• Following very nice paper by Gulyas (’17)
Deﬁnition
Dynamic sorting := temporal comovement b/w worker & ﬁrm types
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Deﬁnition
Dynamic sorting := temporal comovement b/w worker & ﬁrm types
Negative Dynamic Sorting:  2 [ 0:071; 0:312]
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
5
0.
00
0.
05
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 a
ve
ra
ge
 w
or
ke
r 
F
E
-0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40
Change in firm-year FE
1-year diff. 3-year diff. 5-year diff. 10-year diff.
Static vs. Dynamic Sorting: A Puzzle?
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Resolution: Within-Firm Pay & Worker Composition
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Summary: Static and Dynamic Sorting
Firm-year FEs
1. are positively correlated with worker FEs in levels
2. are negatively correlated with worker FEs in differences
3. as ﬁrms age, they increase pay but hire lower paid workers
Conclusion
Summary and Key Insight
We ﬁnd an important role for ﬁrm pay dynamics:
1. 50% greater role for ﬁrm heterogeneity w/ dynamic pay policies
2. Firm-year pay related to ﬁrm ﬁnancials (R2 = 0:385)
3. Fluctuations (RMSE = 0:056) and mean reversion ( = 0:865)
4. Changes in ﬁrm-year pay related to changes in ﬁrm ﬁnancials
5. Sorting is positive in cross section but negative over time
=) Opens up new perspective on (dynamics of) workers and ﬁrms!
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Illustration: Initial worker distribution Back
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Illustration: Who is not in the connected set? Back
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First Stage Results: Firm FEs instead of Firm-Year FEs Back
AKM equation: yit = i +  j + Xit + "it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Var  yijt 0.236 0.230 0.231 0.234 0.235
Var (bi) 0.121 0.120 0.125 0.130 0.131
Var
 b j 0.032 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.013
Var (t) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Var

Xit b 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.019
2P Cov () 0.003 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.019
Var  b"ijt 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.049
Corr
bi; b jt 0.056 0.134 0.169 0.181 0.182
Observations 21,145,007 18,425,427 15,091,142 11,313,701 9,392,584
Unique workers 3,056,376 2,801,551 2,437,724 1,959,034 1,685,029
Unique ﬁrms 411,361 112,262 33,754 8,303 3,656
Largest connected set 98.5% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
R2 0.782 0.779 0.783 0.788 0.790
Firm FE type Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Income concept Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Minimum ﬁrm size 0 5 15 50 100
First Stage Results: Wages instead of Earnings Back
AKM equation: yit = i +  jt + Xit + "it
(1) (2) (3)
Var  yijt 0.124 0.124 0.124
Var (bi) 0.089 0.089 0.089
Var
 b jt 0.009 0.009 0.008
Var

Xit b 0.012 0.012 0.012
2P Cov () 0.007 0.007 0.008
Var  b"ijt 0.007 0.007 0.007
Corr
bi; b jt 0.080 0.082 0.087
Observations 8,067,111 8,021,504 7,825,645
Unique workers 1,640,798 1,624,288 1,570,087
Unique ﬁrms 85,833 64,050 41,264
Largest connected set 99.5% 99.8% 100.0%
R2 0.944 0.944 0.943
Firm FE type Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year
Income concept Wage Wage Wage
Minimum ﬁrm size 0 5 15
Second Stage: Firm Pay & Observables, by Firm Size Back
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Second Stage: Firm Pay & Observables, by Firm Age Back
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Second Stage: Worker Pay & Observables, Added Firm FEs Back
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Firm size (log employees) 0.023 0.008 0.004 0.001
Firm age (years) 0.035 -0.002 0.023 0.017
Sales per worker (log SEK) 0.070 0.013 0.009 0.005
Value added per worker (log SEK) 0.121 0.056 0.011 0.011
Assets per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.014 0.004 -0.018
Debt per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.018 0.005 0.018
Equity per worker (log SEK) 0.036 0.004 0.001 0.003
Investment per worker (log SEK) 0.022 -0.004 0.000 -0.000
Observations 13,865,483 13,865,483 13,421,121 13,421,121
R2 0.385 0.830
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Income concept Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Minimum ﬁrm size 15 15 15 15
Second Stage: Worker Pay & Observables, Larger Firms Back
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Firm size (log employees) 0.023 0.008 0.014 0.006
Firm age (years) 0.035 -0.002 0.033 -0.006
Sales per worker (log SEK) 0.070 0.013 0.070 0.016
Value added per worker (log SEK) 0.121 0.056 0.116 0.053
Assets per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.014 0.053 0.008
Debt per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.018 0.053 0.019
Equity per worker (log SEK) 0.036 0.004 0.035 0.007
Investment per worker (log SEK) 0.022 -0.004 0.023 -0.003
Observations 13,865,483 13,865,483 10,521,969 10,521,969
R2 0.385 0.417
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income concept Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Minimum ﬁrm size 15 15 50 50
